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R974provide essential ecosystem services 
on which many poor people depend. 
Tropical forests contain the majority 
of the world’s rapidly vanishing 
indigenous cultures and its peoples 
living in voluntary isolation [5]. 
REDD could also slow the loss of 
biodiversity — important in itself 
and in its central contribution 
to ecosystem services [6]. Over 
half of all species live in tropical 
forests and are under threat from 
deforestation [7]. Many species are 
also threatened with extinction from 
global climate disruption [8], and may 
well be additional to those lost from 
deforestation [9]. 
These additional benefits may 
not accrue if REDD rules are poorly 
designed and implemented. We now 
explore why this could happen and 
suggest how to prevent it. 
Design
If REDD emphasizes reducing 
deforestation rates, then 
governments and market forces will 
likely focus on areas of threatened 
forest that are cheapest to protect. 
The Marburg Declaration expressed 
concerns that biodiversity ‘hotspots’ 
might not be cost-competitive [2]. 
Biodiversity loss concentrates in 
hotspots which, by definition, have 
both high numbers of endemic 
species and high levels of habitat 
loss [10]. Tropical moist forest 
hotspots retain only ~10% of their 
original forest [10] and have high 
rates of human population growth 
[11]. Protection costs will be much 
higher than for forest elsewhere — 
such as the Amazon, where at 
present ~85% of the forest remains. 
Time scale matters, for at present 
rates of deforestation, extinction 
rates in even the relatively intact 
forests — such as the Amazon —  
will soon match those in the  
hotspots [7].
The 190 countries that are party 
to the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are 
negotiating the successor to the 
Kyoto Protocol and hope to complete 
it in Copenhagen in December 
2009. This ‘Copenhagen Agreement’ 
expects to directly involve 
developing countries in slowing 
global warming via a mechanism to 
reduce carbon emissions caused 
by deforestation. The premise of 
REDD (Reduced Emissions from 
Deforestation and Degradation) is 
that tropical forest countries would 
be compensated if they reduce their 
rates of deforestation and thus their 
emissions of greenhouse gases. 
During the negotiations, REDD has 
expanded in scope and now includes 
the sustainable management of 
forests and the conservation and 
enhancement of forest carbon 
stocks. By default, it should have 
multiple benefits. Unfortunately, the 
final rules could safeguard carbon 
stocks but nonetheless fall short of 
their potential to protect biodiversity 
[1] — concerns reiterated in the 
Marburg Declaration by leading 
tropical biologists [2]. We explain the 
reasons for this and then suggest 
how careful policies can avoid harm 
to biodiversity.
REDD’s potential advantages 
are easily stated. Tropical forests 
contain half of all carbon stored in 
terrestrial vegetation [3], and clearing 
and degradation of tropical forests 
constitutes 18% of all anthropogenic 
carbon emissions (~1.4 Gt carbon 
per year) [4]. Yet only afforestation 
and reforestation are included in the 
Kyoto Protocol. REDD can greatly 
strengthen UNFCCC measures to 
reduce carbon emissions, protect 
biodiversity, and provide other human 
benefits.
Reduced deforestation should 
have many other benefits. Forests 
Essay
Alan Grainger1, Douglas H. Boucher2, Peter C. Frumhoff2,  
William F. Laurance3,4, Thomas Lovejoy5, Jeffrey McNeely6, Manfred Niekisch7, 
Peter Raven8 , Navjot S. Sodhi9, Oscar Venter10 and Stuart L. Pimm11,*
Reducing carbon emissions through slowing deforestation can benefit 
biodiversity best if countries implement sensible policies. 
Biodiversity and REDD at Copenhagen If REDD also emphasizes 
forests with the greatest density 
of carbon, these too may not be 
the most important for biodiversity 
conservation. While some hotspots 
have high stocks of carbon, others 
do not, and not all are forests 
[10]. Geographical scale matters, 
however. At the scale of hotspots 
(which sometimes cover several 
countries) and of individual countries 
themselves, carbon density and 
conservation needs correlate poorly 
[12,13]. At smaller, experimental 
scales, increased diversity increases 
biomass and productivity [14].
Between these are within-country 
scales. Land prices, opportunity 
costs, and carbon density vary 
considerably from place-to-
place — as they do for reforestation 
projects [15] — so there will likely 
be opportunities to reduce carbon 
emissions from deforestation that are 
also biodiversity-friendly [16].
Another concern is ‘leakage’, 
whereby deforestation processes 
are not effectively abated by REDD 
but simply displaced to other areas. 
Site-specific conservation projects 
could save forests locally, but 
displace deforestation elsewhere. For 
instance, the establishment of forest 
reserves in the Peruvian Amazon 
contributed to forest degradation 
and clearing increasing in adjacent 
areas by 300–470% [17]. REDD 
policies are intended to minimize 
leakage by requiring emissions 
from deforestation to be reduced 
against national or large regional 
baselines, but risks remain. Recent 
modeling suggests that up to 95% 
of reductions in one country may be 
leaked as increased degradation in 
others [18]. So implementing REDD 
might accelerate the conversion and 
degradation of high-biodiversity areas 
where REDD or other conservation 
funding is not available [1]. 
Finally, REDD might cause 
some nations to backslide on their 
environmental legislation, thinking 
that they might become eligible for 
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the future. Central to UNFCCC rules is 
the concept of ‘additionality’ — credit 
can only be given for new actions, 
not ones already taken. Indonesia, 
for instance, recently removed its 
legislation prohibiting clearing of 
peat-swamp forests, and some 
suspect that the prospect of future 
REDD funding played a part in this 
[19]. 
Implementation
The Parties to the UNFCCC are 
currently split on whether to finance 
REDD through carbon markets, or to 
use either public funding or voluntary 
private funding to provide payments 
to governments. Potentially huge 
sums are involved — $20 billion could 
cut emissions by 0.5 Gt C — making 
REDD an inexpensive solution relative 
to alternatives such as industrial 
energy efficiency or solar or nuclear 
power — and do so by 2020 [20].
Under one option, governments 
would receive direct payments 
for securing a target reduction in 
deforestation rates below a reference 
level based on existing rates. Some 
worry that developing countries 
with limited human and financial 
resources might focus on protecting 
carbon- rich forests to meet their 
REDD targets, even if this undermines 
other ecosystem services and 
social welfare. (Experience in public 
administration in some developed 
countries like the UK shows that 
meeting targets can sometimes lead 
to the neglect of other essential 
public services [21].) Decades of 
forest policies and conservation 
practice suggest that REDD-financed 
initiatives to slow deforestation rates 
will only be successful if they create 
socially viable and economically 
attractive alternatives to land 
conversion.
Market-based approaches trade 
credits for reducing emissions from 
deforestation for a price per ton 
of carbon. They would inherently 
value forests only for their carbon, 
ignoring other ecosystem services. 
Paying more for reducing emissions 
in biodiversity-rich forests than for 
reductions in biodiversity-poor forests 
is unfortunately not likely to work 
and could create perverse incentives. 
If credits for reducing emissions 
are to be sold as offsets in carbon 
markets, then buyers — industrialized 
country companies that want to use these credits to cover some of their 
emissions — will seek out the lowest 
prices. From the buyer’s perspective, 
when they buy emissions permits in 
the market, a ton is a ton, whether 
from a high- or low-diversity forest.
The Parties could counter 
the limitations of market-based 
approaches by separating payments 
for biodiversity, made using  
non-carbon market financing, from 
payments for reduced emissions 
originating in market transactions. 
This would mobilize the power of 
private carbon markets to pay for the 
emission reductions, yet discourage 
low-price, low biodiversity schemes. 
Suitably combined payments for 
carbon and biodiversity could 
promote both simultaneously. 
Promotion of biofuels under 
the UNFCCC could deal a serious 
blow to the effectiveness of REDD 
in protecting forest carbon and 
biodiversity. It is now apparent that 
clearing tropical forests to establish 
biofuel feedstocks — especially 
intensive crops such as oil palm, 
soy and sugarcane — not only 
increases net emissions and reduces 
biodiversity but makes REDD less 
economically competitive except 
in remote or agriculturally marginal 
areas that are under the least 
threat [22]. 
Yet under UNFCCC incentives, 
there is still a strong possibility that 
biofuel crops could greatly expand 
in low-carbon ecosystems and 
degraded forests, which if left alone 
would recover to their natural state. 
These are the areas where, in the 
absence of strong counter-measures, 
REDD-related leakage may intensify 
land conversion. 
Compartmentalization
In the latest text of the Copenhagen 
Agreement, the Parties are undecided 
about whether to include specific 
rules to protect biodiversity when 
designing REDD schemes, or to 
assume that protecting biodiversity 
is a co-benefit that will happen 
automatically [23].
One reason for this is political 
compartmentalization. At the UN 
Conference on Environment and 
Development in 1992, the UNFCCC 
was given responsibility for 
combating climate change and the 
UN Convention on Biological Diversity 
(UNCBD) was given responsibility 
for protecting biodiversity. They also function in different ways [24]. 
The UNFCCC has developed an 
increasingly complex set of rules 
(especially under the Kyoto Protocol), 
while the UNCBD adopts a ‘softer’ 
regulatory stance [25]. The two 
conventions communicate via a Joint 
Liaison Group that shares information 
between their secretariats. In 2004, 
the UNCBD and UNFCCC agreed 
on a Joint Work Programme. The 
UNCBD’s rules, however, are too 
weak to require Parties to forego any 
UNFCCC actions that could damage 
biodiversity [25]. 
Divisions among biologists may 
reinforce compartmentalization. 
Some focus on forest carbon, others 
on biodiversity. This helps explain 
why carbon sequestration studies 
pay only limited attention to their 
biodiversity impacts. The journal 
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies 
for Global Change, for example, 
has published just one paper with 
‘biodiversity’ in its title [26], and 
this is representative of a general 
neglect of this issue [27]. While many 
papers cover the impacts of climate 
disruption on biodiversity, only a 
few consider the impacts of climate-
change mitigation on biodiversity, 
or how to integrate management of 
carbon and biodiversity [27].
Solutions
The Copenhagen agreement needs 
to reach political agreement on swift 
and deep reductions of greenhouse 
gases. Nevertheless, it need not 
neglect biodiversity and other 
benefits. This can be achieved by 
four main actions: 
• First, rules to conserve 
biodiversity should be included in the 
text of the Copenhagen Agreement. 
Biodiversity conservation should 
not be assumed to be an automatic 
‘co-benefit’. We recommend that 
national implementation standards for 
REDD include biodiversity-inclusive 
environmental impact assessments 
[28]. The UNFCCC does not have a 
mandate to protect biodiversity, but 
mitigating climate change should 
not harm biodiversity. The Parties 
have already implicitly recognized 
the importance of ‘conservation’ 
in moving from REDD to REDD+, 
though this only refers in practice 
to conserving carbon stocks. These 
changes will simply extend this to 
ensure that conservation explicitly 
includes biodiversity. The Parties 
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support to sustain existing protected 
areas or establish new ones as part 
of the overall financial package for 
reducing emissions under REDD+.
• Second, the UNFCCC’s 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA) should 
ask the IPCC to explicitly include 
assessment of the biodiversity 
and ecosystem service impacts 
of mitigation alternatives in all 
future reports of Working Group III. 
Moreover, they should convene a 
joint working group of conservation 
biologists and ‘carbon ecologists’ to 
produce a Technical Paper describing 
a feasible method for optimal 
co-management of carbon and 
biodiversity ecosystem services.
• Third, the Parties to the 
UNFCCC should invite the Parties 
to the CBD to consent to make 
cooperation on the biodiversity 
impacts of climate-change mitigation 
a priority item in their joint work 
programme.
• Fourth, the SBSTA should also 
ask the IPCC to report any evidence 
of transnational leakage. If it occurs 
on the scale that some modelling 
suggests [18], it would undercut the 
carbon as well as the biodiversity 
benefits of REDD. The U.S. Waxman-
Markey bill [29], the European 
Commission [30], and many countries 
in the UNFCCC negotiations [23] 
propose to use non-market funds — 
foreign aid, government revenues 
from auctioning pollution permits, 
private donations, and so on — to 
pay for “stabilization” of forests in 
countries (such as Suriname) with 
large forests and low deforestation 
rates that are not eligible for 
REDD carbon market funds under 
guidelines now proposed. This would 
be an important counterweight to 
international leakage. 
• Finally, while we want REDD 
to “do no harm” to biodiversity 
and want to maximize the positive 
biodiversity impacts of REDD 
policies, we do not expect this 
single mechanism to fully address 
all tropical biodiversity funding 
priorities. The considerable amount 
of private conservation funding could 
be redirected and focused on forests 
of high biodiversity value that would 
not otherwise be eligible for REDD 
funding.
Biodiversity, itself, is essential to 
ecosystem adaptation. Ensuring that REDD policies not only reduce 
carbon emissions but conserve 
biodiversity will ensure that humanity 
and the biosphere can be as resilient 
as possible to climate disruptions. 
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